Prediction is based on past cases. We assume that a predictor can rank eventualities according to their plausibility given any memory that consists of repetitions of past cases. In a companion paper, we show that under mild consistency requirements, these rankings can be represented by numerical functions, such that the function corresponding to each eventuality is linear in the number of case repetitions. In this paper we extend the analysis to rankings of events. Our main result is that a cancellation condition a la de Finetti implies that these functions are additive with respect to union of disjoint sets. If the set of past cases coincides with the set of possible eventualities, natural conditions are equivalent to ranking events by their empirical frequencies. More generally, our results may describe how individuals form probabilistic beliefs given cases that are only partially pertinent to the prediction problem at hand, and how this subjective measure of pertinence can be derived from likelihood rankings. We use the same mathematical results to obtain an axiomatic derivation of expected utility maximization under risk. Combining it with the previous results, we o®er an account of the cognitive process by which one may become expected utility maximizer in face of uncertainty.
Introduction
Prediction is a fundamental cognitive function. It is one of the hallmarks of intelligence. It is essential to reasoning and to decision making. Some view prediction as the main goal of science. How do and how should we generate predictions? People often resort to statistical inference. Indeed, statistics o®ers two main methodologies for prediction. The¯rst, which is typically associated with classical statistics, is frequentist. It suggests that probabilistic prediction be based on observed empirical frequencies. The second, tightly related to Bayesian statistics, argues for the formation of a prior probability, to be updated in face of observations by Bayes rule. Both approaches have certain drawbacks, as normative as well as descriptive theories. The frequentist approach limits itself to situations that are repeated in seemingly identical conditions. Further, it does not incorporate subjective beliefs, intuition, and the like.
The Bayesian approach applies to all conceivable prediction problems. But it says very little about the way in which one can form a prior. The contributions of Ramsey (1931 ), de Finetti (1937 , and Savage (1954) argue that Bayesian expected utility maximization is the only normatively acceptable decision rule, and that in-principle-observable preferences can uniquely de¯ne a prior. Probabilities have also been axiomatically derived from qualitative plausibility judgments, where the latter are modeled as binary relations (see Kraft, Pratt, and Seidenberg (1959) , Krantz, Luce, Suppes, and Tversky (1971) , Fine (1973) , Fishburn (1986) ) or as propositions (see Fagin, Halpern, and Megiddo (1990) , Fagin and Halpern (1994) , Aumann (1995) , Heifetz and Mongin (1999) ).
1 These axiomatic derivations do not explicitly model the information based on which a prior is formed. Further, they do not attempt to provide an account of this cognitive process. Thus, the axiomatizations of Bayesian beliefs and of Bayesian expected utility maximization may convince you that you would like to be Bayesian, but they do not provide the self-help tools that are needed to become a practising Bayesian. The goal of this paper is to model explicitly the link between factual knowledge and derived beliefs. Alternatively, from the viewpoint of the frequentist approach, our aim is to generalize the notion of empirical frequencies to situations that are not repeated under precisely the same conditions. A few examples may help to illustrate our goals.
Example 1: A die is rolled over and over again. As far as the predictor can tell, or to the best of her knowledge, all rolls were made under identical conditions. Also, the predictor does not know of any reason to consider any outcome more likely than any other. The frequentist approach seems reasonable in this case. Moreover, the Bayesian approach, starting out with a positive probability for each outcome and assuming i.i.d. rolls, will converge to the empirical frequencies as well. For this case there does not seem to be a need for any new theory. We will only use it as a benchmark, and expect a theory of prediction to coincide with the frequentist approach in this case.
Example 2: The Little Prince travels in space and reaches a new planet. This is his¯rst stop since he left his own planet and his rose. He may wonder whom he may encounter on this planet, whether it will be a fox or a king (assuming he can conceive of those), or something completely di®erent. He has no knowledge to base his beliefs on. The frequentist approach remains silent on this issue. The Bayesian approach shames the Little Prince into forming a prior, but gives him no indication as to how to do it. As a test of consistency, one may expect the Little Prince to argue that meeting a king is just as likely as meeting a fox. But we do not expect a theory of prediction to say much that is enlightening about this case of complete ignorance.
Example 3: A physician is asked by a patient if she predicts that a surgery will succeed in his case. The physician knows whether the procedure succeeded in most cases in the past, but she will be quick to remind her pa-tient that every human body is unique. Indeed, the physician knows that the statistics she read included patients who varied in terms of age, gender, medical condition, and so forth. It would therefore be too naive of her to quote statistics as if the empirical frequencies were all that mattered. On the other hand, if the physician will consider only past cases of patients that are identical to hers, she will probably end up with an empty data set.
Example 4: An expert on international relations is asked to predict the outcome of the con°ict in Kosovo. She is expected to draw on her vast knowledge of past cases, coupled with her astute analysis thereof, in forming her prediction. Yet she is not expected to simply compute how often military con°icts were resolved in this way or the other.
Examples 3 and 4 present intermediate cases between repeated situations
and complete ignorance. In both examples, available databases provide relevant information, but not all pieces of information are relevant to the same degree. We seek a theory of prediction that would make use of the available information, but will allow di®erent past cases to have di®erential relevance to the prediction problem.
Consider the following prediction rule, say, for Example 3. The physician considers all known cases of successful surgeries. She uses her subjective judgment to evaluate the similarity of each of these cases to the patient she is treating, and she adds them up. She then does the same for unsuccessful treatments. It seems reasonable that the outcome with the larger aggregate similarity value be her prediction. Similarly, the expert in Example 4 may base her prediction on all known cases, using her expertise in two ways: (i) in recalling past cases; (ii) in assessing their similarities to the situation at hand.
Observe that, in the special case in which all past cases are deemed to be equally relevant to the present case, this prediction rule coincides with a frequentist prediction, that is, with the mode of a frequentist probability. On the other hand, in case the database of past cases is empty, this rule will not di®erentiate between di®erent eventualities. This rule allows subjective judgment in assessing similarities of cases. Yet, it does not insist that subjective judgments be speci¯c enough to form a Bayesian prior in the absence of information.
In Gilboa and Schmeidler (1999b) we axiomatize this rule. We assume that a predictor has a ranking of possible eventualities given any possible memory (or database). A memory consists of a¯nite set of past cases, or stories. These are not assumed to have any particular structure. However, we do assume that any case, such as \the die came out on 4" can appear in memory any number of times. Our main assumption is that prediction satis¯es a combination axiom. Roughly, it states that if an eventuality a is more likely than an eventuality b given two possible disjoint memories, then a is more likely than b also given their union. Coupled with two additional axioms (of continuity and of diversity), the combination axiom necessitates that prediction is made according to the rule suggested above. Moreover, we show that the similarity evaluations underlying the prediction are almost unique.
This result can be interpreted in several ways. From a descriptive viewpoint, one may argue that experts' predictions tend to be consistent as required by our axioms (of which the combination is the most important), and that they can therefore be represented as aggregate similarity-based predictions. From a normative viewpoint, our result can be interpreted as suggesting the aggregate similarity-based predictions as the only way to satisfy our consistency axioms. In both approaches, one may attempt to measure similarities using the likelihood rankings given various databases.
In the present paper we address the case in which the objects to be ranked have a logical or algebraic structure. That is, instead of eventualities, which can be viewed as states of the world, we assume that the predictor ranks events. The additional structure allows us to impose an additional condition of event cancellation a la de Finetti. Our main result is that this condition is equivalent to the condition that the similarity values, for each case, are additive with respect to the union of disjoint sets. It therefore describes the way that a predictor, who is committed to this cancellation condition, may form probabilistic beliefs over events given any possible memory.
We then proceed to test our model in the benchmark example of frequentism. That is, we assume that each case observed in the past can only be one of the possible eventualities in the problem at hand. Under this structural assumption it is natural to state two additional assumptions on plausibility rankings, which are shown to be equivalent to frequentism, namely, to ranking events by their empirical frequencies.
While it is reassuring to know that frequentism is a special case of our model, we consider it a conceptually simple problem. The more interesting problems, as in Examples 3 and 4 above, are those in which each past case is pertinent to the present problem to a certain subjective degree. Our results show how one may form probabilistic beliefs based on partially relevant information. Conversely, they also show how qualitative \at least as plausible as" comparisons may be used to elicit the subjective similarity judgments, and when these can be assumed additive with respect to set union.
The focus of this paper is on the formation of probabilities as a generalpurpose tool for the quanti¯cation of plausibility judgments. It is natural, however, to wonder how our derivation of probabilities relates to the classical decision-theoretic derivations thereof, which are typically coupled with expected utility maximization. To this end, we¯rst provide a new characterization of expected utility maximization under risk, and consider a process in which the decision maker¯rst forms probabilistic beliefs and then uses them to reduce a decision problem under uncertainty to a decision problem under risk. We o®er this as a possible account of how people might behave as expected utility maximizers.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 quotes relevant results from a companion paper. Section 3 presents the formal model and main results. Section 4 deals with the situation in which the set of past cases coincides with the set of possible eventualities, and how frequentism then follows as a special case of our approach. Section 5 presents the derivation of expected utility. Section 6 concludes with a discussion of the cognitive foundations of expected utility maximization. It also o®ers a decision-theoretic interpretation of previous results, suggesting an implicit de¯nition of a state space given case-based preferences. Also, the decision-theoretic interpretation provides a uni¯ed framework within which expected utility theory and case-based decision theory can be embedded and compared. Finally, an appendix contains all proofs.
Ranking Predictions
Consider a prediction problem, in which one is asked to rank eventualities in a non-empty set X. The predictor is equipped with knowledge of cases, facts, observations, or stories. Let M be a¯nite a non-empty set of cases, representing the predictor's knowledge. The person (or the machine) who is supposed to come up with predictions is assumed to have a well-de¯ned \at least as likely than" relation on A, that presumably relies on M . Hence, for a di®erent collection of cases the predictor may have a di®erent \at least as likely than" relation. We assume that such a relation is given not only for the actual state of knowledge, but also for all hypothetical ones, that are generated from it by replication of cases. Formally, consider the set of repetitions of cases J = J M = Z M + = fIjI : M ! Z + g where Z + denotes the non-negative integers. For simplicity, we will refer to elements of J as \memories". We assume that for every I 2 J the predictor has a binary relation \at least as likely than" º I on X (i.e., º I µ X £ X).
Algebraic operations on J are performed pointwise. We de¯ne Â I and ¼ I to be the asymmetric and symmetric parts of º I , as usual.
We will use the following axioms:
A1 Order: For every I 2 J, º I , is complete and transitive on X.
A2 Continuity: For every I; J 2 J and every a; b 2 X, if a Â I b, then there exists k 2 N such that for all k¸k, a Â kI+J b. Axiom 1 simply requires that, given any conceivable memory, the decision maker's preference relation over acts is a weak order. Axiom 2 is a continuity, or an Archimedean axiom. It states that if, given the memory I, the predictor believes that eventuality a is strictly more plausible than b, then, no matter what is her ranking for another memory, J, there is a number of repetitions of I that is large enough to overwhelm the ranking induced by J. Axiom 3 states that if eventuality a is more plausible than eventuality b given two disjoint memories, a should also be more plausible than b given the combination of these memories. In our set-up, combination (or concatenation) of memories takes the form of adding the number of repetitions of each case in the two memories.
Finally, we need a diversity axiom that is not necessary for the functional form we would like to derive. While the theorem we present is an equivalence theorem, it characterizes a more restricted class of plausibility rankings than those discussed in the introduction. Speci¯cally, we require that for any four eventualities, there is a memory that would distinguish among all four of them.
A4 Diversity: For every list (a; b; c; d) of distinct elements of X there exists I 2 J such that a Â I b Â I c Â I d. If jXj < 4, then for any strict ordering of the elements of X there exists I 2 J such that Â I is that ordering.
We now quote a result of a previous work which will be used in this paper.
Theorem 2.1 (Gilboa-Schmeidler (1999b) ): Let there be given M and fº I g I2J . Then the following two statements are equivalent if jXj¸4 :
(ii) There is a matrix v : X £ M ! R such that:
(¤¤) for every I 2 J and every a; b 2 X,
and, for every list (a; b; c; d) of distinct elements of X, the convex hull of di®erences of the row-vectors
Furthermore, in this case the matrix v is unique in the following sense: v and w both satisfy (¤¤) i® there are a scalar¸> 0 and a matrix u :
X £ M ! R with identical rows (i.e., with constant columns) such that w =¸v + u .
Finally, In the case jXj < 4, the numerical representation result (as in (¤¤)) holds, and uniqueness as above is guaranteed.
Observe that, for a di®erent memory M 0 , the theorem would yield a matrix v 0 that may be completely unrelated to the matrix v of the memory M . This would imply that the similarity judgments may depend not only on the cases compared, but also on other cases in memory. Should one want to rule out this possibility, one should require an additional axiom. Before we introduce it, a piece of notation will be useful: for two memories M and M 0 satisfying M µ M 0 , and for each I 2 J M , let I 0 2 J M 0 be the extension of I to M 0 de¯ned by I(c) = 0 for c 2 M 0 nM . We can now state the condition guaranteeing that the similarity function is independent of memory: Gilboa-Schmeidler (1999b) ): Let there be given a set of cases C, a problem p with a set of alternatives X, and a family M of¯nite subsets of C . Assume that for every M 2 M, fº I g I2Z M
+
, satisfy A1-A4, that jXj¸4; and that M is closed under union. Then the following two statements are equivalent:
(i) A5 holds on M;
(ii) For every c 2 C and every a 2 X there exist a number v(a; c) such that (¤¤) of Theorem 2.1 (ii) holds for every M 2 M.
Finally, we quote the following observation from Gilboa-Schmeidler (1999b): assume that X is a set of theories, or general rules one is to rank according to plausibility given memory. Axioms A1-4 appear reasonable for this case, and one can derive the representation (¤¤). If we shift the weights v(a; c) so that they are all negative, they can be interpreted as logarithms of the conditional probability of case c given theory a. Thus Theorem 2.1 can be viewed as an axiomatization of ranking theories, or probability distributions, based on the likelihood function, together with a derivation of the conditional probabilities used in the likelihood function.
Ranking Events
The predictions discussed in Section 2 are abstract eventualities, lacking any logical or algebraic structure. It is natural to ask how similarity-based ranking of prediction relates to basic logical or set operations. In an attempt to address this question, we focus here on the case in which the alternatives to be ranked are events.
Let -be a state space. Let § be an algebra of events on -. Assume that § contains all singletons. Assume further that -contains at least 5 states. We assume that a \at least as likely than" relation between events in § that are not included in each other. More precisely, two events A; B 2 § are said to be non-included if AnB; BnA 6 = ;. We assume that only such pairs are ranked. In particular, we are interested only in proper non-empty subsets of -in §. For reasons that will be clari¯ed in the proof, it is convenient to rule out of the discussion all proper subsets of -whose complement is a singleton. We therefore focus on § 0 = fA 2 § j A 6 = ; and jA c j > 1g.
The application of Theorem 2.1 to the case of events is not immediate, because we only assume ranking between non-included events, and because the diversity axiom would require some modi¯cations. We start by re-stating the¯rst three axioms for the case at hand. Next we turn to the diversity axiom used in Section 2. Observe that, as stated, it cannot hold for any four-tuple of events. First, one cannot expect an event A to be strictly more plausible than an event B if A µ B. Second, if one ranks plausibility according to a probability measure, and if
where 1 E denotes the indicator function of E 2 §), one cannot expect any memory to induce the ranking
The proposition that follows shows that the exceptions above are the only ones.
Proposition 3.1 Suppose that (A; B; C; D) are four events in a measurable space (-; §). Then there exists a probability measure P on § such that and
It follows that, for a quadruple of pairwise non-including events, condition (ii) is necessary and su±cient for the existence of a measure that strictly ranks the four events in the given order. The proposition above motivates the following de¯nitions: (A; B; C; D) 2 § 0 4 is a list of orderly di®erentiated events if no event in the list is a subset of a follower in the list, and neither
The events fA; B; C; Dg are properly di®erentiated if every permutation thereof generates a list of orderly di®erentiated events. In order not to rule out rankings that agree with probability measures, we will restrict the requirement of diversity as follows:
A4* Restricted Diversity: For every list of orderly di®erentiated events (A; B; C; D), there exists I 2 J such that
We can now state Theorem 3.2 Under the structural assumptions above, the following two statements are equivalent:
(ii) There is a matrix v : § 0 £ M ! R such that:
(¤¤) for every I 2 J and every pair of non-included events A; B 2 § 0 , This result states that a method that ranks events by their likelihood, given any possible repetition of known cases, has to be equivalent to a numerical ranking where the number attached to each event is a linear function of the numbers of case repetitions. One naturally wonders, what would it take to make these numbers probabilities. That is, when is there a probability measure ¹ c for each case c, such that memory I induces the same ranking of events as the measure
The next results provide some partial answers to this question.
Obviously, a necessary condition for a representation by additive measures is that, for every I 2 J, º I satis¯es de Finetti's cancellation axiom: for every three events A; B; C such that (
A key result is that, if we impose this condition (restricted to non-included events) on top of the conditions of Theorem 3.2, the resulting matrix v can be normalized so that it is additive in events, namely, so that
. Moreover, in this case we obtain uniqueness of the representation up to multiplication by a positive constant. Formally, we introduce the following axiom:
A6 Cancellation: For every I 2 J, and for every three pairwise non-
Theorem 3.3 Under the structural assumptions above, the following two statements are equivalent:
(i) f º I g I2J satisfy A1*-A4* and A6;
(ii) There are¯nite, signed, and¯nitely additive measures f¹ c g c2M such that:
(¤¤) for every I 2 J and every pair of non-included events A; B 2 § 0 ,
and, for every list of orderly di®erentiated events (A; B; C; D), the convex hull of the vectors
, and The statement (and proof) of Theorem 3.3 does not restrict -to be¯nite.
Yet, the restricted diversity axiom may do so. For instance, it is easy to see that, if the measures ¹ c are non-negative, A4* can be satis¯ed only if -is, indeed,¯nite. However, one may have versions of the theorem that allow in¯nite -(say, with an in¯nite set of memories, as in Theorem 5.2 below). Theorem 3.3 only guarantees representation by signed measures. Indeed, since we only use comparisons of pairwise non-included events, the data fº I g I2J do not imply that likelihood rankings are monotone with respect to set inclusion. One may require that, for each I 2 J, º I , be a qualitative probability according to de Finetti (1937) , namely, that:
(i) º I is complete and transitive on §;
(ii) for every three events A; B; C such that (A [ B) \ C = ;, we have
(iii) for every event A, A º I ;;
Observe that this condition would strengthen both A1 and A6. One may conjecture that imposing this condition would yield a representation such as in (¤¤) of Theorem 3.3 for all pairs of events. As stated, the answer cannot be in the a±rmative since any numerical representation by f¹ c g c2M would yield A ¼ 0 B for all A; B 2 § (where 0 2 J denotes the memory in which all cases appear zero times), contradicting (iv). A more natural condition to impose is, therefore, A1' Qualitative Probability: For every I 2 J, º I satis¯es (i)-(iii) of the de¯nition above, and if I 6 = 0, º I also satis¯es (iv).
Yet, even with this weakening the conjecture is false:
Remark 3.5 Assume that fº I g I satisfy A1', A2*, A3*, A4*. It is possible that the signed measures f¹ c g c2M obtained in Theorem 3.3 fail to be nonnegative.
Frequentism
The framework of Section 3 does not assume any formal relationship between past cases and states of the world. Indeed, one of the strengths of the approach outlines above is that any such relationships may be inferred from plausibility rankings given various memories, rather than assumed a-priori. Still, an interesting special case, which is also an important test case, is the situation where memory consists only of past occurrences of the same states that are now possible. For instance, one may be asked to rank the possible outcomes of a roll of a die based on empirical frequencies of these outcomes in past rolls of the same die. It would be reassuring to know that our approach is compatible with frequentism, i.e., that the numerical rankings derived in Section 3 may boil down to relative empirical frequencies in this case.
Assume, then, that M = -= f1; : : : ; ng, where I 2 J is interpreted as the empirical frequencies of the possible outcomes. Assume that fº I g I2J are qualitative probability relations. We impose two additional assumptions. The¯rst is a symmetry axiom, stating that the names of the outcomes are immaterial. The second is speci¯city axiom, requiring that an outcome that has never been observed does not increase the plausibility of events containing it. For the symmetry axiom, we introduce the following notation: let ¼ : f1; : : : ; ng ! f1; : : : ; ng be a permutation. For I 2 J, de¯ne I ± ¼ 2 J by
A7 Symmetry: For every permutation ¼, every I 2 J, and every
Next we introduce A8 Speci¯city: Assume that for j 2 -and I 2 J, I(j) = 0. For every A; B 2 §, such that B º I A, we also have B º I A [ fjg.
Theorem 4.1 Assume that n¸5 and that f º I g I satisfy A1
0 , A2*, A3*, A4*,A7, and A8. Let f¹ i g be the measures provided by Theorem 3.3. Then (¹ i (fjg)) 1·i;j·n is the identity matrix, up to multiplication by a positive number.
In the case n < 5 Theorem 3.3 does not provide a representation of f º I g I by measures ¹ i . Yet, we can simply assume a representation along the lines of Theorem 3.3 and obtain a similar result:
Remark 4.2 Let f º I g I2J be a collection of binary relations on § = 2 -, and let f¹ i g be non-negative measures on -such that for every I 2 J and every A; B 2 §,
Remark 4.3 Assume that f º I g I2J satisfy A1 0 ;A7 and A8. Then (¹ i (fjg)) 1·i;j·n is the identity matrix, up to multiplication by a positive number.
Observe that A7 and A8 are obviously necessary for the two results.
Expected Utility Under Risk
The previous sections addressed the question of the formation of probabilities, as general purpose numerical representations of likelihood judgments. In this section we deal with the way these probabilities might be used in decision making under uncertainty. A natural benchmark is the paradigm of expected utility maximization, namely the suggestion that probabilities be used for the computation of expected value of a desirability function, and that decisions be made so as to maximize this expected value. Yet one may ask, how natural is expected utility maximization? And which utility function should be maximized? One possible answer is the classical expected utility theorem of von-Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) , deriving a utility function, and the expected utility formula, assuming a preference relation between lotteries with given probabilities. This section presents an answer that is conceptually similar to that of vNM's, though closer in spirit to the analysis above. In the next section we proceed to relate it to the more general problem of decision making in face of uncertainty, that is, when probabilities are not explicitly given.
Assume that a decision maker is facing a decision problem with a nonempty set of acts A and a¯nite, non-empty set of states of the world -.
(Observe that here -plays the role of M in Sections 2-3 above, whereas the set of acts A is the counterpart of -in Sections 2-3.) Such problems are often represented by a \decision matrix", or a \game against nature", attaching to each act-state pair (a; i) an outcome. We do not assume any knowledge about this set of outcomes or about the structure of the matrix, and hence suppress it completely. (Equivalently, one introduces a formal set of abstract outcomes that is simply the set of pairs A £ -.) Let ¢ = ¢(-) be the set of probability distributions on -. We assume that, for every probability vector p 2 ¢, the decision maker has a binary preference relation º p over A. We now formulate axioms on fº p g p2¢ that correspond to those of Section 2: A1** Order: For every p 2 ¢, º p is complete and transitive on A. Finally, in the case jAj < 4, the numerical representation result (as in (¤¤)) holds, and uniqueness as above is guaranteed.
The proof of this theorem is omitted. It is a minor variation on the proof of Theorem 2.1.
Theorem 5.1 states that, given a set of acts A and a set of states -, one may¯nd a matrix of utility numbers, U = (u (a; i)) a2A;i2-, such that, given any probability vector on -, the decision maker ranks the acts according to their expected utility. Thus, in a manner analogous to the result of vonNeumann and Morgenstern (vNM), we derive a utility function together with expected utility maximization, from choices between acts whose distributions are known. Moreover, as in vNM's result, we assume a weak order that is continuous in probabilities and that respects some form of convexity in the space of distributions, from which follows a representation that is linear in probabilities. Yet, there are several di®erences between vNM's result and Theorem 5.1. vNM assume that one may compare all lotteries de¯ned over a given set of outcomes. Thus, one may think of the data for vNM's theorem as comparisons of all possible distributions over pairs of rows and columns in the matrix. By contrast, we assume that the decision maker can compare only lotteries derived from two rows in the matrix for the same probability vector over the columns. In particular, the data assumed in Theorem 5.1 will not include a comparison of a certain outcome (i.e., a degenerate lottery) to a non-degenerate lottery. However, we need here an additional axiom to guarantee the expected utility representation. We opt for a diversity axiom. This axiom gives us, in addition to the representing matrix, an independence or separation condition. The latter implies, among other things, that there are no (weakly) dominated rows in the representing matrix. Finding an exact characterization of the numerical representation (¤¤) (without the separation condition) is a possible direction for future research.
Observe that the decision matrix may be viewed as the game form of a two-person game. In this case a probability vector p 2 ¢ is interpreted as a mixed strategy of the column player. For each such strategy, the row player has a preference ranking over her pure strategies. Should these preference orders satisfy our axioms, we obtain the expected utility maximization result. The uniqueness result states that the utility function can be shifted by an additive constant in any given column, resulting in the same preference ordering for each p 2 ¢. Indeed, such a shift, as well as multiplication by a positive constant leave the best-response correspondence intact. This is the standard uniqueness assumption on payo® functions in noncooperative games.
Another possible direction for future research is to obtain a similar result in the context of n-person games, where each player has preferences over her pure strategies given distributions over the pure strategies of the other n ¡ 1 players that are stochastically independent. (Compare Fishburn (1976) and Fishburn and Roberts (1978) .)
Finally, we note that theorem 5.1 can be easily extended to in¯nite state spaces, since its proof relies on separation theorems. For concreteness, we formulate the generalized result.
Assume that a decision maker is facing a decision problem with a nonempty set of acts A and a measurable space of states of the world (-; §). Let P = P(-) be the set of¯nitely additive probability measures on -. Assume that, for every probability measure p 2 P, the decision maker has a binary preference relation º p over A. We now formulate axioms on fº p g p2P that correspond to those of Section 2: A1** Order: For every p 2 P, º p is complete and transitive on A. (i) f º p g p2P satisfy A1**,A2***,A3**,A4**;
(ii) For every a 2 A there exists a bounded, §-measurable real-valued function u a on -such that (¤¤) for every p 2 P and every a; b 2 A,
and, for every list (a; b; c; d) of distinct elements of A, the convex hull of di®erences of the functionals (u Finally, in the case jAj < 4, the numerical representation result (as in (¤¤)) holds, and uniqueness as above is guaranteed.
The proof of Theorem 5.2 is also omitted for brevity's sake. It is a straightforward adaptation of the proof of Theorem 5.1.
The Cognitive Foundations of Expected Utility Maximization
The classical axiomatic derivations of Bayesian probabilities by Ramsey (1931 ), de Finetti (1937 , and Savage (1954) derive probabilities from observed choices. Their behavioral approach does not purport to describe an actual mental process of belief formation. Rather, it suggests that the meaning of probability judgments be found in the way they are used in decision making. Further, this approach does not require that the decision maker be aware of probabilities, their meaning, their sources, or their uses. Finally, even if the decision maker happens to be a cognate entity who can reason in terms of probabilities, the behavioral axiomatic approach does not attempt to follow the causal link from probabilities to behavior, but to reason backwards from observed behavior to the probability judgments that could have rationalized it. Our approach is di®erent. Since we tend to have greater con¯dence in behavioral models that are also cognitively plausible, our goal is to axiomatically study the cognitive process by which probabilities are formed, and then the process by which they are used in decisions, to the extent that they indeed are. Thus, we adopt a cognitive axiomatic approach that, as opposed to the behavioral one, attempts to follow the causal link from cognition to decision, in those cases where such a conscious link that involves probabilities does exist. According to our story, conscious expected utility maximization starts with developing a state space, presumably encompassing all possible eventualities; proceeds with the formation of probabilistic beliefs over this state; and concludes with the computation of expected utility with respect to this probability.
Our theory does not o®er an account of the formation of the state space.
States and events are assumed primitive in this paper. We will shortly see that our theory may suggest an implicit way to ascribe states of the world to a decision maker, but it does not say how these are generated. In line with the case-based approach, one may argue that the states of the world that an individual imagines are either cases that she or others have experienced in the past, or some variations on these known themes. For instance, the derivation of frequentism in Section 4 assumes that the set of possible states is exactly the set of the cases observed. More generally, one may perform certain operations on past cases to generate new possible states from them.
At this point, however, our theory says nothing about the grammar of these operations. Given a state space, the theory developed in Sections 2-4 attempts to shed some light on the way in which probabilities over states are formed. The axiomatic approach derives the theoretical concept of probability from presumably-observable \at least as likely as" relations, but the formula we obtain does not treat the formation of beliefs as a \black box". Rather, it suggests that probabilities are, or should be, obtained from summations of similarity values, multiplied by the number of repetitions. Speci¯cally, Theorem 3.3 suggests that there exists a matrix V , whose rows denote states of the world and whose columns denote past cases, such that, given a vector of nonnegative integers I 2 J, specifying the number of occurrences of each case, states of the world are assigned (not necessarily normalized) probabilities p de¯ned by
That is, for every state i, one computes P c2M I(c)v(a; c) and treats it as the probability of this state.
The last stage of expected utility maximization consists of computation of expected utility given the probabilities obtained above. Here again our theory does not o®er an account of the mental process of utility evaluation. Like classical utility theory, expected utility theory, and related paradigms, we derive utility indices from observations, but say very little about the way an individual actually thinks about this problem. However, Theorems 5.1-5.2 do support the expected utility paradigm, and o®er a way to de¯ne, or even elicit a utility matrix U such that, for every probability vector p, every two acts a; b are ranked according to a function f where
That is, for every act a one computes P i2-p(i)u(a; i) and chooses an act so as to maximize this index.
Assume that there are n acts, m cases, and s states. In this case, the matrix V is of dimension s £ m, the vector I of dimension m, and the probability vector p = V I { of dimension s. Similarly, the dimension of the matrix U is n £ s, and the evaluation vector f is of dimension n. In particular, it makes sense to multiply U by V and to get a new matrix S´U V of dimension n £ m. We then have
This algebra only says that, if probabilities p are linear in repetitions I, and evaluations f are linear in probabilities p, then evaluations f are also linear in repetitions I. Indeed, one may go back to Theorem 2.1 and reinterpret it as a theorem about choice under uncertainty. That is, replace the set of objects X by the set of acts A, and interpret º I as a preference order over acts, given a case-repetition pro¯le I. Our axioms seem to be plausible in this interpretation as well, and they imply that decisions be made according to the following rule: for each act a and each case c there is a number s(a; c) such that acts are ranked according to f (a) = P c2M I(c)s(a; c). That is, that there be an n £ m matrix S such that f = SI ranks acts according to their desirability.
One may start out with the choice interpretation of Theorem 2.1 and suggest a case-based decision theory according to which the decision maker ranks acts by f = SI. In this case the equality S´U V could be viewed as a decomposition of the matrix S: rather than lumping together the various e®ects that case c has on the desirability of act a in one number s(a; c), let us spell out the implicit reasoning by which the past case makes the act more or less desirable. If we decompose the matrix S into a product U V , we can attribute to the decision maker a reasoning process that involves states of the world. The matrix V speci¯es beliefs: to what extent each case c render each state s plausible. The matrix U , in turn, represents tastes: to what extent the decision maker would like to choose act a in state s. Hence, if we only have access to choice behavior data, that is, we can only observe the matrix S, we may attribute to the decision maker a set of states, such that their probabilities are derived from cases as in Section 3, and that they are used in decisions according to the expected utility paradigm as in Section 5. Naturally, such a decomposition S = U V is always possible, if only by identifying states with cases and setting V to be the identity matrix. But one would hope that this decomposition may be more meaningful and intuitive than that, and, furthermore, that in many decisions the number of states may be smaller than the number of past cases.
This interpretation can therefore entail a behavioral de¯nition of states of the world: given observable behavior S, imagined states are ascribed to the decision maker. Our primary interpretation, however, is cognitive: expected utility theory makes sense precisely when states of the world are palpable cognitive objects. That is, when people can imagine them, think about them, compare them, and so forth. In these situations, it stands to reason that states be ranked according to probabilities, as suggested by Theorem 3.3. Should a decision maker also satisfy the assumptions of Theorem 5.1, expected utility maximization would result.
We argue that the decision rule f = SI (I 2 J) may be intuitively appealing in a wider class of situations than its decomposition f = U V I. Consider an¯nancial expert who is asked to rank order acts according to their desirability. The expert may¯nd it very hard to come up with an exhaustive state space on which probabilities might be formed, but she typically has a recommendation to the decision maker. Assume now that two di®erent experts are consulted, and that they both recommend act a over act b. None of them purports to support her recommendation with a spelled-out model of states of the world. Yet, it seems plausible that the decision maker would prefer a to b as well. In other words, the combination axiom of Theorem 2.1 makes sense when the rankings º I are preference relations over acts (rather than plausibility relations over eventualities), even if states of the world cannot be formulated in an intuitive way.
Ranking acts according to f = SI may be viewed as a generalization of expected utility theory (EUT) and of case-based decision theory (CBDT) of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995 ,1997 ,1999a . By identifying cases with states and setting V to be the identity matrix, one may represent an expected utility maximizer as a case-based f maximizer who recalls a case for each conceivable state, and whose probability judgments are based on empirical frequencies. Thus f maximization generalizes EUT. On the other hand, CBDT is a special case of f maximization where the entries in the matrix S are products of similarity judgments and utility evaluations. For an axiomatic derivation of this decomposition see Gilboa, Schmeidler, and Wakker (1999) .
Appendix: Proofs and Related Analysis
Proof of Proposition 3.1: Let there be given four events A; B; C; D in a measurable space (-; §). It su±ces to consider the minimal algebra containing these events, which is nite. Assume that the atoms in this algebra are -0 = f1; : : : ; ng. It is easy to see that there exists a probability measure P on § such that P (A) > P (B) > P (C) > P (D) i® the following LP problem is feasible:
Problem (P ) is feasible i® its dual is bounded. The dual is
Clearly, (D) is bounded i® it is bounded by zero, and this is the case i® its only feasible point is ®;¯;°= 0.
We now prove that conditions (i) and (ii) imply these equalities. Assume, by way of negation, that (¤) holds and let ®;¯;°¸0 but not all three are equal to zero.
Observe¯rst that if exactly one of ®;¯;and°is positive, it follows that at least one of the inclusions; A µ B, B µ C, or C µ D holds, in contradiction to (i).
Next assume that exactly two of ®,¯, and°are positive. Suppose¯rst that¯= 0 . Condition (ii) implies that for some k , 1 So we are left with the case where all three, ®,¯, and°, are positive.
Since the¯rst inequality in (ii) does not hold, there exists i for which 1
We consider the¯ve possibilities, as above: 1 + 1 > 1 + 0; 0 + 1; 0 + 0 or 1 + 0; 0 + 1 > 0 + 0 . Substituting the corresponding values in (¤) we get that at least one of the following¯ve inequalities holds:
The positivity of ® ,¯, and°leaves only¯· ® or¯·°:
By (i), there is a state j 2 AnD . Again, using (¤) , we get one of the following four inequalities: ® · 0 , ® ¡ ® +¯· 0 , ® ¡¯+°· 0 , and ® ¡ ® +¯¡¯+°· 0 , depending on whether j belongs to B and to C or not.
Three of the inequalities are directly inconsistent with positivity of ®,¯, and°.
The fourth, namely, ® +°·¯, is also inconsistent with positivity when coupled with either of¯· ® or¯·°obtained previously. This concludes the proof that (i) and (ii) su±ce for the existence of a probability measure
The necessity of (i) and (ii) is obvious. ¤¤
Proof of Theorem 3.2:
We will construct the numerical representation by \patching" together numerical representations for subsets of events that are properly di®erenti-ated. In doing so, a few auxiliary results will be of help. We start by the following de¯nition. Suppose that for a subset of events ¢ µ § 0 there is a matrix v ¢ : ¢ £ M ! R. Let ¢ 0 be a subset of ¢. We say that v ¢ ranks ¢ 0 if for every non-included E; F 2 ¢ 0 , and every I 2 J,
. In order to extend a numerical representation v ¢ to a larger set ¢, we would like to know that such a representation is unique on relatively small subsets ¢ 0 . For instance, when we consider triples of pairwise nonincluded events A; B; C, it would be nice to know that a function v that ranks fA; B; Cg is unique as in Theorem 2.1. For this one would need to have a diversity axiom for triples of events, namely that for any permutation thereof there exists an I 2 J such that Â I agrees with the given permutation. One would expect this to follow from the seemingly more powerful diversity assumption A4*, stated for all quadruples of orderly di®erentiated events. However, not every triple of pairwise non-included events can be complemented to a quadruple of orderly di®erentiated events. Consider, for instance, n = 5, A = f1; 2; 3g, B = f4g, C = f5g. These are pairwise nonincluded, but there is no event D that is pairwise non-included with respect to all of them.
This case is anomalous enough to deserve a de¯nition. We say that three events A; B; C 2 § 0 form an all-but-two partition if two of them are singletons and the third is the complement of the (union of the)¯rst two. We now state Lemma 1: Let A; B; C 2 § 0 be three pairwise non-included events that do not form an all-but-two partition. Then there exists I 2 J such that A Â I B Â I C.
Proof: First observe that, since A; B; C are pairwise non-included, there exist probability measures P on -such that P (A) > P (B) > P (C). We will shortly prove that there exists an event D that is non-included with respect to each of A; B, and C. We can choose a probability P such that P (A) > P (B) > P (C) and that P (D) di®ers from each of fP (A); P (B); P (C)g. This would mean, by Proposition 3.1, that one of the four lists, f(D; A; B; C), (A; D; B; C), (A; B; D; C), (A; B; C; D)g is orderly di®erentiated. We can then use the diversity axiom for that list to deduce the desired result.
We therefore wish to prove that there exists an event D that is non- (Recall that § includes all singletons, and therefore also all pairs.) We then extend it to singletons. Next we show that it can be extended to all events in § 0 .
De¯ne ¢ 2 = fA 2 § 0 j jAj = 2g.
Lemma 4: There exists v ¢ 2 : ¢ 2 £ M ! R that ranks ¢ 2 .
Proof: Choose an element of -, and call it 1. We¯rst consider ¢ 1 2 = ff1; igji 6 = 1g. Any four events in ¢ 1 2 are properly di®erentiated, and Theorem 2.1 can be applied to obtain a representation v In Case (ii) we have A = fi; jg, B = fi; kg where i; j; k are distinct and di®er from 1. Observe that ff1; ig; f1; jg; fi; jg; fi; kgg are properly di®erentiated. By the Lemma 3, since v ¢ 2 ranks ff1; ig; f1; jg; fi; jgg and ff1; ig; f1; jg; fi; kgg, it also ranks ffi; jg; fi; kgg. ¤ Our next step is to extend v ¢ 2 to singletons. Let ¢ 2 = fA 2 § 0 j jAj · 2g.
Lemma 5: There exists v
Proof: Let v ¢ 2 equal v ¢ 2 on all pairs. We now extend it to all singletons, and then show that this extension indeed ranks ¢ 2 . Let there be given i 2 -.
Choose distinct j; k; l 6 = i. There is a unique de¯nition of v ¢ 2 (fig; c) Let this be the de¯nition of v ¢ 2 (fig; c) for each i 2 -. We need to show that for every distinct i; j 2 -, v ¢ 2 ranks ffjg; figg. Since j-j¸5, there are two distinct C; D 2 ¢ 2 that are disjoint from fi; jg. Thus, ffig; fjg; C; Dg are properly di®erentiated, while v ¢ 2 ranks both ffig; C; Dgg and ffjg; C; Dgg, which completes the proof. ¤
The following combinatorial lemma will prove useful.
Lemma 6: Let A and B be two non-included events in § 0 . Then there are C and D in § 0 , with jCj; jDj = 2, such that fA; B; C; Dg are properly di®erentiated.
Proof: Assume without loss of generality that jAj¸jBj, and distinguish between two cases: Case 1: jAnBj¸2; Case 2: jAnBj = jBnAj = 1. In Case 1 set i; j 2 AnB, i 6 = j, and k 2 BnA. De¯ne C = fi; kg and D = fj; kg. By direct veri¯cation one can check that the conclusion of the lemma holds. Next consider Case 2. Since j-nAj; j-nBj¸2, there is a state p 2 -n(A [ B). Assume¯rst that there also is a state q 6 = p; such that q 2 -n(A [ B). Let i 2 AnB, and k 2 BnA: If A and B are singletons, there exists j 2 -nfi; k; p; qg and we can choose C = fj; pg and D = fj; qg.
Otherwise (namely, A \ B 6 = ;) de¯ning C = fi; pg and D = fk; qg results in the desired conclusion.
We are now left with Case 2 under the additional restriction that j-n(A[ B)j = 1. Since j-j¸5, we know that jA \ Bj¸2. De¯ne C = fp; kg and D = fp; lg, where k 6 = l, k; l 2 A \ B. Once again, direct veri¯cation completes the proof. ¤ Completion of the Proof of Theorem 3.2: We now proceed to de¯ne v = v § 0 : § 0 £M ! R that ranks § 0 , as an extension of v ¢ 2 . Let there be given an event A 2 § 0 with jAj > 2. Let i be an element in -that is not included in A, and let j; k be two elements that are in A. Since fA; fi; jg; fi; kgg are pairwise non-included and they do not form an all-but-two partition, Theorem 2.1 applies to them and o®ers a unique de¯nition of v(A; c) (for all c 2 M) such that v ranks fA; fi; jg; fi; kgg.
We now wish to show that v thus de¯ned ranks fA; Bg for all non-included A; B 2 § 0 . If jAj; jBj · 2, the result follows from the de¯nition of v as an extension of v ¢ 2 . Assume, then, that jAj > 2. We split the proof into three parts according to the number of elements in B.
First assume that jBj = 2. Recall that i is an element in -that is not included in A, and that j; k are two elements that are in A. There are four cases to check, according to whether i 2 B and whether A and B are disjoint. In all cases, direct veri¯cation shows that fA; B; fi; jg; fi; kgg are properly di®erentiated, and Lemma 3 implies that v ranks fA; Bg.
Next assume that jBj = 1, i.e., that B = flg where l = 2 A. Choose s = 2 A [ flg. Since j; k are in A, fA; B; fs; jg; fs; kgg are properly di®erentiated, and Lemma 3 implies that v ranks fA; flgg. This was also proven in detail in Gilboa-Schmeidler (1999b) . ¤ The proof of su±ciency and of uniqueness are as in Gilboa-Schmeidler (1999b) . ¤¤
Proof of Theorem 3.3:
The fact that (ii) implies (i) is immediate. We will show that (i) implies (ii) and the uniqueness result for the case of a¯nite algebra.
Assume, then, that -= f1; : : : ; ng (recall that n¸5) and that § = 2 -, and letv be the matrix provided by Theorem 3. Proof: Consider three events A; B; D that are pairwise non-included, none of which includes i, and none of which has more than n ¡ 3 elements. We know that But since we also have the Jacobi identity
the restricted diversity axiom implies that¸= ¹ =´. Applying this result for the case that A; B; D are singletons, we conclude that there exists¸i > 0 such that the conclusion holds for all singletons A; B. Next, for every A 2 § 0 such that i 6 2 A and jAj < n ¡ 2, and every and, coupled with the diversity axiom this means that¸j =¸k =¸l. ¤ Until the end of the proof we reserve the symbol¸to the coe±cient de¯ned by Lemma 3.
Lemma 4: For every distinct i 2 -nf1; 2g,
Proof: By symmetry between 1 and 2, it su±ces to prove the¯rst equation. Equating the two, it has to be the case thaţ Proof: By induction on jAj. We already know that the lemma holds for jAj · 2. Assume it is true for jAj · k and consider a set B with jBj = k + 1 < n ¡ 1. Choose i 2 B and j 6 2 B. Since B and fi; jg are non-included, we may write One may verify that fº I g I are qualitative probability relations satisfying A2-A4, even though ¹ 1 (f1g) < 0. 
